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Daron Acemoglu: Difference between revisions

Turkish-American economist (born 1967)

Kamer Daron Acemoğlu (Turkish: [daˈɾon aˈdʒemoːɫu];[1] born September 3, 1967) is a Turkish-American economist of Armenian descent who has taught at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology since 1993, where he is currently the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics, and was named an Institute Professor at MIT in 2019.[2] He received the John Bates Clark Medal in 2005, and the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2024.[2][3]

Acemoglu ranked third, behind Paul Krugman and Greg Mankiw, in the list of “Favorite Living Economists Under Age 60” in a 2011 survey among American economists. In 2015, he was named the most cited economist of the past 10 years per Research Papers in Economics (RePEc) data. According to the Open Syllabus Project, Acemoglu is the third most frequently cited author on college syllabi for economics courses after Greg Mankiw and Paul Krugman.[4]

In 2024, Acemoglu, James A. Robinson and Simon Johnson, were awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their comparative studies in prosperity between states and empires.[5]

Early and personal life

Kamer Daron Acemoğlu[6][7][a] was born in Istanbul to Armenian parents on September 3, 1967.[10][11][12] His father, Kevork Acemoglu (1938–1988), was a commercial lawyer and lecturer at Istanbul University. His mother, Irma Acemoglu (d. 1991), was the principal of Aramyan Uncuyan [tr; hy], an Armenian elementary school in Kadıköy,[13][14][15] which he attended, before graduating from Galatasaray High School in 1986.[16][17][18] He became interested in politics and economics as a teenager.[15] He was educated at the University of York, where he received a BA in economics in 1989, and at the London School of Economics (LSE), where he received an MSc in econometrics and mathematical economics in 1990, and a PhD in economics in 1992.[19] His doctoral thesis was titled Essays in Microfoundations of Macroeconomics: Contracts and Economic Performance.[10][7] His doctoral advisor was Kevin W. S. Roberts.[20] James Malcomson, one of his doctoral examiners at the LSE, said that even the weakest three of the seven chapters of his thesis were “more than sufficient for the award of a PhD.” Arnold Kling called him a wunderkind due to the age at which he received his PhD (25).[22]

Acemoglu is a naturalized U.S. citizen.[23] He is fluent in English and Turkish,[24] and speaks some Armenian.[25] He is married to Asuman “Asu” Ozdağlar, a professor of electrical engineering and computer science at MIT,[15][26] who is the daughter of İsmail Özdağlar, a former Turkish government minister. Together, they have authored several articles.[27][28] As of 2015, they live in Newton, Massachusetts with their two sons, Arda and Aras.[29]

Academic career

Daron Acemoglu: Difference between revisions
Acemoglu in 2009
Acemoglu in his office, January 2020

Acemoglu was a lecturer in economics at the LSE from 1992 to 1993.[2] He was appointed an assistant professor at MIT in 1993, where he became the Pentti Kouri Associate Professor of Economics in 1997, and was tenured in 1998.[2][30] He became a full professor at MIT in 2000, and served as the Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics there from 2004 to 2010.[2][31] In 2010, Acemoglu was appointed the Elizabeth and James Killian Professor of Economics at MIT.[10] In July 2019, he was named an Institute Professor, the highest faculty honour at MIT.[32]

As of 2019, he has mentored over 60 PhD students.[32] Among his doctoral students are Robert Shimer, Mark Aguiar, Pol Antràs, and Gabriel Carroll.[20] In 2014, he made $841,380, making him one of the top earners at MIT.[33]

Acemoglu is a research associate at the NBER, and was elected a Fellow of the Econometric Society in 2005.[19][2][34] He was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2006, and to the National Academy of Sciences in 2014.[35][36] He is also a Senior Fellow at the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, and a member of several other learned societies.[19][37][38] He edited Econometrica, an academic journal published by the Econometric Society, from 2011 to 2015.[39]

Acemoglu has authored hundreds of academic papers.[40] He noted that most of his research has been “motivated by trying to understand the sources of poverty.”[23] His research includes a wide range of topics, including political economy, human capital theory, growth theory, economic development, innovation, labor economics,[19] income and wage inequality, and network economics, among others.[42] He noted in 2011 that most his research of the past 15 years concerned with what can be broadly called political economy.[43] He has made contribution to the labor economics field.[23]

Acemoglu has extensively collaborated with James A. Robinson, a British political scientist, since 1993.[30] Acemoglu has described it as a “very productive relationship.” They have worked together on a number of articles and several books, most of which on the subject of growth and economic development.[23] The two have also extensively collaborated with economist Simon Johnson.[44]

Research and publications

Acemoglu is considered a follower of new institutional economics.[45][46][47] His influences include Joel Mokyr, Kenneth Sokoloff,[48] Douglass North,[49] Seymour Martin Lipset,[50] and Barrington Moore.[50]

Books

Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy

Published by Cambridge University Press in 2006, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy by Acemoglu and Robinson analyzes the creation and consolidation of democratic societies. They argue that “democracy consolidates when elites do not have strong incentive to overthrow it. These processes depend on (1) the strength of civil society, (2) the structure of political institutions, (3) the nature of political and economic crises, (4) the level of economic inequality, (5) the structure of the economy, and (6) the form and extent of globalization.”[51]

Romain Wacziarg praised the book and argued that its substantive contribution is the theoretical fusion of the Marxist dialectical materialism (“institutional change results from distributional struggles between two distinct social groups, a rich ruling class and a poor majority, each of whose interests are shaped primarily by economic forces”) and the ideas of Barry Weingast and Douglass North, who argued that “institutional reform can be a way for the elite to credibly commit to future policies by delegating their enactment to interests that will not wish to reverse them.”[52] William Easterly called it “one of the most important contributions to the literature on the economics of democracy in a long time.” Edward Glaeser described it as “enormously significant” work and a “great contribution to the field.”[53]

Why Nations Fail

Why Nations Fail was included in the Shortlist of the 2012 Financial Times Business Book of the Year Award.

In their 2012 book, Why Nations Fail, Acemoglu and Robinson argue that economic growth at the forefront of technology requires political stability, which the Mayan civilization (to name only one) did not have,[54] and creative destruction. The latter cannot occur without institutional restraints on the granting of monopoly and oligopoly rights. They say that the Industrial Revolution began in Great Britain, because the English Bill of Rights 1689 created such restraints.

Acemoglu and Robinson insist that “development differences across countries are exclusively due to differences in political and economic institutions, and reject other theories that attribute some of the differences to culture, weather, geography or lack of knowledge about the best policies and practices.”[55] For example, “Soviet Russia generated rapid growth as it caught up rapidly with some of the advanced technologies in the world [but] was running out of steam by the 1970s” because of a lack of creative destruction.[56]

The book was written for the general audience.[55] It was widely discussed by political analysts and commentators.[57][58][59][60] Warren Bass wrote of it in The Washington Post: “bracing, garrulous, wildly ambitious and ultimately hopeful. It may, in fact, be a bit of a masterpiece.”[61]

Clive Crook wrote in Bloomberg News that the book deserves most of the “lavish praise” it received.[62] In his review in Foreign Affairs Jeffrey Sachs criticized Acemoglu and Robinson for systematically ignoring factors such as domestic politics, geopolitics, technological discoveries, and natural resources. He also argued that the book’s appeal was based on readers’ desire to hear that “Western democracy pays off not only politically but also economically.”[63] Bill Gates called the book a “major disappointment” and characterized the authors’ analysis as “vague and simplistic.”[64] Ryan Avent, an editor at The Economist, responded that “Acemoglu and Robinson might not be entirely right about why nations succeed or fail. But at least they’re engaged with the right problem.”[65]

The Narrow Corridor

In The Narrow Corridor. States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty (2019), Acemoglu and Robinson argue that a free society is attained when the power of the state and of society evolved in rough balance.
[66]

Power and Progress

Published in 2023, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity is a book by Acemoglu and Simon Johnson on the historical development of technology and the social and political consequences of technology.[67] The book addresses three questions, on the relationship between new machines and production techniques and wages, on the way in which technology could be harnessed for social goods, and on the reason for the enthusiasm around artificial intelligence.

Power and Progress argues that technologies do not automatically yield social goods, their benefits going to a narrow elite. It offers a rather critical view of artificial intelligence (AI), stressing its largely negative impact on jobs and wages and on democracy.

Acemoglu and Johnson also provide a vision about how new technologies could be harnessed for social good. They see the Progressive Era as offering a model. They also discuss a list of policy proposals for the redirection of technology that includes: (1) market incentives, (2) the break up of big tech, (3) tax reform, (4) investing in workers, (5) privacy protection and data ownership, and (6) a digital advertising tax.[68]

Papers

Social programs and policies

In a 2001 article, Acemoglu argued that the minimum wage and unemployment benefits “shift the composition of employment toward high-wage jobs. Because the composition of jobs in the laissez-faire equilibrium is inefficiently biased toward low-wage jobs, these labor market regulations increase average labor productivity and may improve welfare.”[69] Furthermore, he has argued that “minimum wages can increase training of affected workers, by inducing firms to train their unskilled employees.”[70]

Democracy and economy

Acemoglu et al. found that “democracy has a significant and robust positive effect on GDP” and suggest that “democratizations increase GDP per capita by about 20% in the long run.”[71] In another paper, Acemoglu et al. found that “there is a significant and robust effect of democracy on tax revenues as a fraction of GDP, but no robust impact on inequality.”[72]

Social democracy and unions

Acemoglu and Philippe Aghion argued in 2001 that although deunionization in the US and UK since the 1980s is not the “underlying cause of the increase in inequality”, it “amplifies the direct effect of skill-biased technical change by removing the wage compression imposed by unions.”[73]

According to Acemoglu and Robinson, unions historically had a significant role in creating democracy, especially in western Europe, and in maintaining a balance of political power between established business interests and political elites.[74]

Nordic model

In a 2012 paper titled “Can’t We All Be More Like Scandinavians?”, co-written with Robinson and Verdier, he suggests that “it may be precisely the more ‘cutthroat’ American society that makes possible the more ‘cuddly’ Scandinavian societies based on a comprehensive social safety net, the welfare state and more limited inequality.” They concluded that “all countries may want to be like the ‘Scandinavians’ with a more extensive safety net and a more egalitarian structure,” however, if the United States shifted from being a “cutthroat [capitalism] leader”, the economic growth of the entire world would be reduced.[75] He argued against the US adopting the Nordic model in a 2015 op-ed for The New York Times. He again argued: “If the US increased taxation to Denmark levels, it would reduce rewards for entrepreneurship, with negative consequences for growth and prosperity.” He praised the Scandinavian experience in poverty reduction, creation of a level playing field for its citizens, and higher social mobility.[76] This was critiqued by Lane Kenworthy, who argues that, empirically, the US’s economic growth preceded the divergence in cutthroat and ‘cuddly’ policies, and there is no relationship between inequality and innovation for developed countries.[77]

Colonialism

“The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development”, co-written by Acemoglu, Robinson, and Simon Johnson in 2001, is by far his most cited work.[40] Graham Mallard described it as an “excellent example of his work: an influential paper that has led to much debate.”[31] They argue that Europeans set up extractive institutions in colonies where they did not settle, unlike in places where they did settle and that these institutions have persisted. They estimated that “differences in institutions explain approximately three-quarters of the income per capita differences across former colonies.”[78][79] Historical experience dominated by extractive institutions in these countries has created a vicious circle, which was exacerbated by the European colonization.[80]

A critique of modernization theory

Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, in their article “Income and Democracy” (2008) show that even though there is a strong cross-country correlation between income and democracy, once one controls for country fixed effects and removes the association between income per capita and various measures of democracy, there is “no causal effect of income on democracy.”[81] In “Non-Modernization” (2022), they further argue that modernization theory cannot account for various paths of political development “because it posits a link between economics and politics that is not conditional on institutions and culture and that presumes a definite endpoint—for example, an ‘end of history’.”[82]

Views

Journalists and economists have described Acemoglu as a centrist.[b] Why Nations Fail was well received by both liberal and conservative economists.[86] Acemoglu’s and Robinson’s long-time collaborator Simon Johnson suggests that their “point is not just about how things may become awful when the government goes off track (a right-leaning point). They are also more deeply concerned about how powerful people fight to grab control of the state and otherwise compete to exert influence over the rest of society (a left-leaning perspective).”[44]

Acemoglu has praised the successes of the Progressive Era, and argued in favor of its replication.[87] Acemoglu argues that the market economy is the only system that creates prosperity. He believes in finding an appropriate balance between “incentivizing creativity, hard work and risk-taking and creating the essential public services, social safety nets and equality of opportunity.”[88] For Acemoglu, markets work only with regulations and predictable laws and that all markets are regulated to some extent; it is only a matter of degree.[30] He suggests that free markets are not unregulated markets.[89]

Wall Street

In September 2008, Acemoglu signed a petition condemning the Bush administration’s bailout plan of the U.S. financial system.[90] As the main cause of the financial crisis of 2007–2008, he stated that policy makers were “lured by ideological notions derived from Ayn Rand’s novels rather than economic theory” and opined: “In hindsight, we should not be surprised that unregulated profit-seeking individuals have taken risks from which they benefit and others lose.”[89] In an early analysis of the Great Recession, Acemoglu wrote: “When channeled into profit-maximizing, competitive, and innovative behavior under the auspices of sound laws and regulations, greed can act as the engine of innovation and economic growth. But when unchecked by the appropriate institutions and regulations, it will degenerate into rent-seeking, corruption, and crime.”[30] He argues that the heavy overrepresentation from the financial sector in the top 1% “has been an outcome of the political processes that have removed all of the regulations in finance, and so created the platform for 40 percent of U.S. corporate profits to be in the financial sector.”[43] He argues that a platform, particularly in Wall Street, has been created “where the ambition and greed of people, often men, has been channeled in a very anti-social, selfish and socially destructive direction.”[91]

Inequality

Acemoglu has voiced concerns regarding the increasing inequality in the US, which in his view turns into political inequality, in turn undermining the inclusiveness of US institutions.[58] In 2012 he identified societal polarization, caused by economic inequality, as the biggest problem for the US.[92] He argues that “democracy ceases to function because some people have so much money they command greater power.”[85] He states that he is comfortable with economic inequality which comes through different social contributions as it is a “price that we pay for providing incentives for people to contribute to prosperity.” However, high levels of inequality create problems as the rich who control significant portions of the societal resources use them to create an “unequal distribution of political power.”[91] He sees the solution in increasing social mobility by “providing an opportunity for the bottom to become rich, not forcing the rich to become poor.”[85]

Acemoglu has praised the American tradition of vibrant protest movements dating back to the Populists and the Progressives.[93] He has also praised Occupy Wall Street for “putting the question of inequality on the agenda, but also for actually standing up for political equality.”[94] He notes that Occupy Wall Street brought the 1% to the attention of the wider public, and to the attention of academia by Tony Atkinson, Thomas Piketty, and Emmanuel Saez.[91]

Specific policies

Acemoglu is in favor of raising and indexing the minimum wage.[95]

Acemoglu believes that universal basic income is “expensive and not generous enough” and that a “more efficient and generous social safety net is needed.”[96] He further called it a “flawed idea” and a “poorly designed policy.” He instead advocates for a “guaranteed-income program [that] would offer transfers only to individuals whose monthly income is below $1,000, thereby coming in at a mere fraction of a UBI’s cost.” He calls for “universal health care, more generous unemployment benefits, better-designed retraining programs, and an expanded earned income tax credit (EITC).”[97] Acemoglu supports a negative income tax, calling it a “more sensible” alternative to UBI.[98]

Acemoglu believes that nation-building by the West is no longer possible around the world because the West now lacks the resources and commitment that were present in post-World War II Germany and Japan, and because countries, such as in the Muslim- and Arab-majority countries, where such work is required today do not trust the West.[99] He views the US war on drugs as a “total and very costly failure”,[100] and supported the 2013 ballot referendum Colorado Amendment 64, a successful popular initiative that legalized the sale of recreational marijuana.[101]

In a 2016 interview with NPR, he opined that the US infrastructure is in a “pitiful state, with negative consequences for US economic growth.”[102]

Socialism, communism, and Marxism

Acemoglu argues that socialist states have not been successful in creating prosperity.[88] He wrote that socialist regimes “from Cuba to the eastern bloc have been disastrous both for economic prosperity and individual freedom.”[103]

In a review written with James A. Robinson, he argues that Thomas Piketty and Karl Marx are “led astray” due to their disregard for “the key forces shaping how an economy functions: the endogenous evolution of technology and of the institutions and the political equilibrium that influence not only technology but also how markets function and how the gains from various different economic arrangements are distributed.”[104]

Social democracy and unions

In 2019, Acemoglu argued in favor of social democracy. He stated: “[Social democracy, when practiced by competent governments] is a phenomenal success. Everywhere in the west is to some degree social democratic, but the extent of this varies. We owe our prosperity and freedom to social democracy.” However, he qualified this statement by arguing that social democracy “did not achieve these things by taxing and redistributing a lot. It achieved them by having labor institutions protecting workers, encouraging job creation and encouraging high wages.”[103] Following from this, Acemoglu opined that the economists of US presidential candidate Bernie Sanders, who is an advocate of democratic socialism along the lines of the Nordic model, “don’t understand basic economics. They are not just dangerous, they are clueless.”[103]

Acemoglu argued that a “tradition of strong labor movement or social democratic party, by constraining the actions of the social planner, can act as a commitment device to egalitarianism, inducing an equilibrium in which the country in question becomes the beneficiary from the asymmetric world equilibrium.”[75]

Donald Trump

In an op-ed in Foreign Policy, Acemoglu claimed that President Donald Trump shared political goals and strategies of Hugo Chávez, Vladimir Putin, and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, such as “little respect for the rule of law or the independence of state institutions, … a blurred vision of national and personal interests, … little patience with criticism and a long-established strategy of rewarding loyalty, which can be seen in his high-level appointments to date. This is all topped by an unwavering belief in his abilities.”[93] In a 2019 interview with Der Spiegel, Acemoglu stated that he sees similarities between Trump and the Republican Party and the Nazis: “Surely, Trump and the Republicans are no Nazis. But they are exploiting the same political sentiment.” He argues that Trump “poses a great risk to U.S. democracy” because he is “looking for a new order with elements of anti-liberalism, misinformation and a lax attitude to corruption. If he is re-elected next year, it will be the beginning of the end of American democracy.”[105]

Authoritarian countries

According to Acemoglu, the three obstacles for economic growth under authoritarian regimes are the tendency of authoritarian regimes to become more authoritarian, their tendency to use power to halt “Schumpeterian creative destruction, which is key to sustaining growth” and the instability and uncertainty caused by internal conflicts.[30] He believes that Saudi Arabia would be like a poor African country without the oil, while the “only thing that is keeping [Russia] going is a big boom in natural resources and a clever handling of the media.”[106]

He believes that China has managed to achieve significant economic growth because it “sort of picked up the low hanging fruit from the world technology frontier, but that sort of growth is not going to last until China goes to the next step, which is harnessing innovation,” which he argues will be impossible “unless economic institutions become even more open and the extractive political institutions in China will be a barrier to that.”[92] He and Robinson wrote for the HuffPost that the “limited rights [China] affords its citizens places major restrictions on the country’s longer-term possibilities for prosperity.”[107]

Turkey

Acemoglu opined that the Republic of Turkey, formed in 1923 by Atatürk, “is very continuous with the Ottoman Empire.” Although the shift from empire to republic brought some positive changes, he argues, the model was largely maintained by the reformers who took power, citing a persistent concentration of power and economic activity.[108] He suggests that the Republican period has been characterized by an unwillingness to accept ethnic minorities.[109] In 2014, Acemoglu condemned the widespread anti-Armenian rhetoric in Turkish textbooks, and demanded that the books be pulled from circulation.[14]

Acemoglu has criticized Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his government for its authoritarian rule.[110] In a 2013 op-ed in The New York Times, following the crackdown of Gezi Park protests, Acemoglu wrote that “Even before the brutal suppression of the demonstrations, the belief that Turkey was on its way to becoming a mature democracy — a role model for the rest of the Middle East — had already become untenable.”[111] In a May 2014 op-ed in Foreign Affairs, Acemoglu wrote that the drift from democracy by Erdogan is lamentable, but an “almost predictable, stage of Turkey’s democratic transition.”[112] In the late 2010s, Acemoglu often criticized Turkey’s economic policies and consequently became popular with the opposition.[113]

Armenia

In a 2015 interview with the Armenian service of Voice of America, Acemoglu stated that he has always been interested in economic, political, and social developments in Armenia.[17] Talking via video, Acemoglu partook in the Armenian Economic Association’s annual conference in October 2013 held at the Yerevan State University, during which he argued that Armenia’s problem is political, and not geographic, cultural, or geopolitical. He called for the Armenian government to be “more responsive to the wishes of its citizens so that through that political process Armenia ceases to be an oligarchy.”[114] In a September 2016 conference in Toronto, Acemoglu criticized the Armenian diaspora for legitimizing the successive governments in Armenia, especially when the rights of its citizens are violated and a wrong economic and political line is being followed for the country.[115] In an April 2017 conference held by the USC Institute of Armenian Studies, Acemoglu stated that while “Armenia could have looked much more like the Czech Republic or Estonia and what we got instead is a country that looks much more like Azerbaijan or Uzbekistan, which is a real shame.” He suggested that in the immediate post-Soviet years Armenia was “stronger and it’s been getting worse and worse.” He criticized the level of corruption of the government, which has systematically closed the political system.[116]

Other countries

In an op-ed for The Globe and Mail following the 2014 Ukrainian revolution, Acemoglu advocated Ukraine “to break with its past as quickly as possible. It needs to move away from Russia, politically and economically, even if that means an end to the natural-gas subsidies Russia has used to keep it in the position of a client state. Even more important is for Ukraine’s leaders to spread political power and economic benefits to the maximum number of its people, including Russian speakers.”[117]

Acemoglu argued that the Greek government-debt crisis was caused by the “terrible state of Greek institutions, and the clientelistic nature of its politics”,[118] and stated that the country’s problems are “political not just macroeconomic.”[119] He identified lack of political integration within the EU as Greece’s problem, and said that “the only way forward for Europe is to have greater fiscal and banking integration or to abandon monetary integration.”[118]

Political involvement

Turkey

Acemoglu in 2018[25]

In March 2011, Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu offered to appoint Acemoglu Turkey’s permanent representative to the OECD in Paris, a post he turned down in order to continue his academic career.[120][121][122][123]

Acemoglu met with Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, leader of the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in October 2022.[124][125] In December 2022 Kılıçdaroğlu appointed Acemoglu, among others, as his economic adviser.[126] Pro-Erdogan circles criticized the move. One pro-government columnist said: “The Armenian Daron Acemoğlu, praised by FETÖ, prepared Kılıçdaroğlu’s vision program, (resembling his own roots).” In response, finance professor Özgür Demirtaş defended Acemoglu. “This tweet is both racist and presumptuous. The influence of Daron Acemoğlu on world’s economy-finance professors is greater than the number of cells in your body. It’s terrible that you talk like this about a professor who made us proud and is going for the Nobel prize.”[127] Yeni Şafak, a pro-government newspaper, ran the headline: “Daron Acemoğlu, one of the new economic advisors of the CHP, could not solve the economic crisis of Armenia.”[128]

Armenia

Following the 2018 Armenian revolution, opposition leader-turned-Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan wrote on his Facebook page that Acemoglu told him that he is ready to help Armenia to “restore and develop” its economy.[129][130] Pashinyan and Acemoglu talked via the internet in June 2018.[131] Acemoglu met with Deputy Prime Minister Tigran Avinyan in Boston in July 2019.[132][133]

Recognition

According to data collected by Research Papers in Economics (RePEc), Acemoglu was the most cited economist of the decade leading to 2015.[134][12][14] According to Google Scholar, his works (including co-authored works) have been cited more than 200,000 times as of January 2023.[40] In a 2011 survey of 299 economics professors in the U.S. Acemoglu ranked third, behind Paul Krugman and Greg Mankiw, in the list of “Favorite Living Economists Under Age 60”.[135]

He was listed 88th in Foreign Policy’s 2010 list of Top 100 Global Thinkers “for showing that freedom is about more than markets.”[136] Acemoglu was voted by the readers of Prospect Magazine as the world’s top thinker for 2024.[137]

Francis Fukuyama has described Acemoglu and his long-time collaborator James A. Robinson as “two of the world’s leading experts on development.”[138] Clement Douglas wrote in the Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis publication that the “scope, depth and sheer volume of [his] scholarship are nothing short of breathtaking, verging on implausible.”[43] Angus Deaton called him a “young superstar” and noted that Acemoglu is “a very good example of the way things ought to be going, which is you do history but you know enough mathematics to be able to model it too.”[139]

Awards

Economics awards
State orders and awards
Honorary degrees

Acemoglu has been awarded honorary degrees from the following universities: Utrecht University (2008),[43] Boğaziçi University (2011), the University of Athens (2014),[19] Bilkent University (2015),[150] University of Bath (2017),[151] ENS Paris-Saclay (2017), London Business School (2018), and the University of Glasgow (2024).[152]

Other

Nobel prize

Acemoglu was long considered a prospective Nobel lauerate.[154][155][156][157][158] In 2024, Acemoglu, jointly with James A. Robinson and Simon Johnson, were awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences for their comparative studies in prosperity between nations.[159] The trio was recognized for their studies on how political and economic institutions impact a nation’s development, highlighting the distinction between inclusive institutions, which promote widespread economic participation and growth, and extractive institutions, which concentrate power and wealth in the hands of a few.[160] Acemoglu became the second ethnic Armenian (after Ardem Patapoutian)[161] and third Turkish national (after Orhan Pamuk and Aziz Sancar) to become a Nobel laureate.[162]

Selected bibliography

  • Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521855266.
  • Acemoglu, Daron (2008). Introduction to Modern Economic Growth. Princeton University Press. ISBN 9781400835775.
  • Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2012). Why Nations Fail. Crown Business. ISBN 978-0307719218.
  • Acemoglu, Daron; Laibson, David and List, John (2014). Principles of Economics, Pearson, New York.
  • Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2019). The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. Penguin Press. ISBN 978-0735224384. Description, arrow-searchable preview, & reviewers’ comments (at bottom).
  • Acemoglu, Daron, and Simon Johnson (2023). Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. New York: PublicAffairs.

References

Notes

  1. ^ Western Armenian: Տարօն Աճէմօղլու.[8][9] Acemoğlu is the Turkified version of the Armenian last name Ajemian (Աճէմեան). Its root derives from the Arabic term ajam, used for non-Arabs, especially Persians. Most of Turkey’s Armenians changed their last names due to the 1934 Surname Law. His first name is the Western Armenian version of Taron, a male given name from a historic region.
  2. ^ “… the middle-of-the-roaders Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson …”[83]
    “Daron Acemoglu, a more centrist economist at MIT …”[84]
    “… Acemoglu, who aligns more with the center than with the populists.”[85]

Citations

  1. ^ “Prof. Dr. Daron Acemoğlu’na Nobel Ekonomi Ödülü’nü Getiren Makale” [The Article that brought Prof. Dr. Daron Acemoglu the Nobel Prize in Economics]. YouTube (in Turkish). BloombergHT. October 15, 2024. Retrieved October 15, 2024.
  2. ^ a b c d e f “Daron Acemoğlu CV August 2022” (PDF). economics.mit.edu.
  3. ^ “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2024”. NobelPrize.org. Retrieved October 14, 2024.
  4. ^ “192,209 Authors”. opensyllabus.org. Open Syllabus. Archived from the original on September 21, 2022.
  5. ^ “The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2024”. NobelPrize.org. Retrieved October 14, 2024.
  6. ^ “Arşaluys Acemoğlu”. Milliyet (in Turkish). May 14, 1985. Archived from the original on October 13, 2010. …Kevork ve İrma Acemoğulları…Kamer Daron Acemoğlu…
  7. ^ a b Acemoglu, Kamer Daron (1992). Essays in microfoundations of macroeconomics : contracts and macroeconomic performance (Ph.D). British Library Board. Archived from the original on October 13, 2017.
  8. ^ “Աճեմօղլու արաջին դիրքի վրայ”. Jamanak (in Armenian). July 31, 2015.
  9. ^ “Տարօն Աճէմօղլու Ստացաւ “Կալաթասարայ” Մրցանակը”. Asbarez (in Armenian). June 28, 2012. Archived from the original on September 17, 2017. Retrieved September 16, 2017.
  10. ^ a b c “Curriculum Vitae Daron Acemoglu”. economics.mit.edu. Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Archived from the original on July 28, 2021. Retrieved September 16, 2017. (archived)
  11. ^ Sorman, Guy (2013). Economics Does Not Lie: A Defense of the Free Market in a Time of Crisis. Encounter Books. p. 31. ISBN 978-1594032547. …Daron Acemoğlu, an Armenian from Turkey…
  12. ^ a b “Istanbul-born MIT professor named world’s most influential economist”. Hürriyet Daily News. July 31, 2015. Archived from the original on September 26, 2021.
  13. ^ “Daron Acemoğlu, dünyanın en önemli 10 iktisatçısından biri”. Agos (in Turkish). October 28, 2013. Archived from the original on September 8, 2017.
  14. ^ a b c “Daron Acemoglu Named Most Influential Economist”. Armenian Weekly. August 7, 2015. Archived from the original on March 8, 2021.
  15. ^ a b c d Gavin, Robert (June 15, 2005). “MIT professor named top economist under 40”. The Boston Globe. (archived)
  16. ^ “Daron Acemoğlu kimdir? Kaç yaşında, nereli, mesleği ne? Prof. Dr. Daron Acemoğlu’nun hayatı ve biyografisi!”. haberler.com (in Turkish). Archived from the original on August 20, 2021. İlköğrenimini İstanbul Kadıköy’deki Aramyan Uncuyan Ermeni İlkokulu’nda tamamladıktan…
  17. ^ a b Tarjimanyan, Arman (April 2, 2015). “Տարոն Աճեմօղլու. “Արտագաղթը սարսափելի վտանգ է Հայաստանի համար”“. azatutyun.am (in Armenian). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (via Voice of America). Archived from the original on December 28, 2019. «Ծնվել ու մեծացել եմ հայկական ընտանիքում, ավարտել Ստամբուլի հայկական տարրական դպրոցը, և, իհարկե, ինձ միշտ հետաքրքրել են տնտեսական, քաղաքական և սոցիալական զարգացումները Հայաստանում», – ասաց պրոֆեսորը։
  18. ^ “Galatasaray Ödülü Daron Acemoğlu’na”. Agos (in Turkish). December 16, 2011. Archived from the original on March 17, 2020.
  19. ^ a b c d e “Faculty & Research: Daron Acemoglu”. mit.edu. Archived from the original on September 9, 2017.
  20. ^ a b “Daron Kamer Acemoglu”. genealogy.ams.org. Mathematics Genealogy Project (Department of Mathematics, North Dakota State University). Archived from the original on November 8, 2017.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  21. ^ Kling, Arnold (October 3, 2007), Acemoglu on Growth, Library of Economics and Liberty
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  23. ^ Examples of Acemoglu speaking Turkish:

  24. ^ a b “Հայաստանը թեւակոխեց զարգացման նոր փուլ՝ Տարոն Աճեմօղլու” [Armenia entered a new stage of development: Daron Acemoglu] (in Armenian). Voice of America Armenian Service. May 31, 2018. Archived from the original on January 4, 2023. Retrieved January 4, 2023.
  25. ^ Hardesty, Larry (June 18, 2013). “Gaming the System”. MIT Technology Review. …Ozdaglar and her husband, the MIT economist Daron Acemoglu…
  26. ^ “Asuman Ozdaglar”. National Bureau of Economic Research.
  27. ^ “Asuman Ozdaglar”. Google Scholar. Archived from the original on October 13, 2020. Retrieved November 10, 2017.
  28. ^ “Political Institutions and Comparative Development”. nber.org. National Bureau of Economic Research. Archived from the original on September 15, 2017.
  29. ^ a b c d e Willson, Simon (March 2010). “Breacher of the Peace”. Finance & Development. 47 (1): 1–4. Archived from the original on October 16, 2017. Alt URL
  30. ^ a b Mallard, Graham (2012). The Economics Companion. Palgrave Macmillan. p. 265. ISBN 9780230356450.
  31. ^ a b c Dizikes, Peter (July 10, 2019). “Daron Acemoglu named Institute Professor”. news.mit.edu. MIT News Office. Archived from the original on July 11, 2019.
  32. ^ Bingham, Emma (June 2, 2016). “MIT’s highest pay goes to administrators, MITIMCo leadership”. The Tech. Archived from the original on September 17, 2017.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  33. ^ “Current Fellows”. www.econometricsociety.org. Retrieved January 23, 2024.
  34. ^ “Member Directory | American Academy of Arts and Sciences”. www.amacad.org. Retrieved January 23, 2024.
  35. ^ “Member Search”. www.nasonline.org. Retrieved January 23, 2024.
  36. ^ “Daron Acemoglu”. cifar.ca.
  37. ^ “Daron Acemoglu”. nber.org. National Bureau of Economic Research.
  38. ^ “Past Editors and Co-editors of Econometrica”. econometricsociety.org. Econometric Society. Archived from the original on November 30, 2016.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  39. ^ a b c “Daron Acemoglu”. Google Scholar.
  40. ^ “Daron Acemoglu”. cifar.ca. Canadian Institute for Advanced Research.
  41. ^ a b c d Clement, Douglas (September 27, 2011). “Interview with Daron Acemoglu”. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis. Archived from the original on September 17, 2017. Retrieved September 16, 2017. (archived)
  42. ^ a b Johnson, Simon (March 8, 2012). “The Koch Brothers, the Cato Institute and Why Nations Fail”. The New York Times.
  43. ^ Dzionek-Kozłowska, Joanna; Matera, Rafał (October 2015). “New Institutional Economics’ Perspective on Wealth and Poverty of Nations. Concise Review and General Remarks on Acemoglu and James A. Robinson’s Concept”. Annals of the Alexandru Ioan Cuza University – Economics. 62 (1): 11–18. doi:10.1515/aicue-2015-0032.
  44. ^ Keefer, Philip; Knack, Stephen (2005). “Social capital, social norms and the New Institutional Economics”. Handbook of New Institutional Economics. pp. 700–725.
  45. ^ “Introductory Reading List: New Institutional Economics”. coase.org. Ronald Coase Institute. Archived from the original on December 25, 2019. Retrieved January 11, 2020.
  46. ^ Why Nations Fail, “Acknowledgments”, p. 209 “Two people played a particularly significant role in shaping our views and encouraging our research, and we would like to take this opportunity to express our intellectual debt and our sincere gratitude to them: Joel Mokyr, and Ken Sokoloff…
  47. ^ Wilkinson, Will (May 10, 2016). “The Great Enrochment and Social Justice”. Niskanen Center. Douglass North and his followers, such as Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson…
  48. ^ a b Dewan, Torun; Shepsle, Kenneth A. (July 2008). “Recent Economic Perspectives on Political Economy, Part II”. British Journal of Political Science. 38 (3): 543–564. doi:10.1017/S0007123408000276. PMC 3630075. PMID 23606754. …Seymour Martin Lipset and Barrington Moore, for example, have clearly influenced Acemoglu and Robinson and other contributors to the literature on redistribution…
  49. ^ “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy”. Cambridge University Press.
  50. ^ Wacziarg, Romain (September 15, 2006). “Determinants of Democratization”. Science. 313 (5793): 1576–1577. doi:10.1126/science.1131936. JSTOR 20031295. S2CID 154213515.
  51. ^ Drazen, Allan (February 2007). “Review: Four Reviews of “Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy”“. The Economic Journal. 117 (517): F162–F183. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0297.2007.02031_1.x. JSTOR 4625479.
  52. ^ e.g., p. 143
  53. ^ a b Radelet, Steven (October 12, 2012). “Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson”. United States Agency for International Development. Archived from the original on September 16, 2017.
  54. ^ p. 150.
  55. ^ “Creating economic wealth: The big why”. The Economist.
  56. ^ a b Friedman, Thomas L. (March 31, 2012). “Why Nations Fail”. The New York Times.
  57. ^ Collier, Paul (March 11, 2012). “Why Nations Fail by Daron Acemoğlu and James Robinson – review”. The Guardian.
  58. ^ Hunter, Janet (August 31, 2012). “Book Review: Why Nations Fail: the Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty by Daron Acemoglu & James A Robinson”. London School of Economics.
  59. ^ Bass, Warren (April 20, 2012). “Book review: ‘Why Nations Fail,’ by Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson”. The Washington Post.
  60. ^ Crook, Clive (April 4, 2012). “‘Why Nations Fail’ Is Not Quite as Good as They Say”. Bloomberg News. Archived from the original on October 27, 2017.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  61. ^ Sachs, Jeffrey (2012). “Government, Geography, and Growth: The True Drivers of Economic Development”. Foreign Affairs. 91 (5): 142–150. JSTOR 41720868.
  62. ^ Gates, Bill (February 26, 2013). “Good Ideas, but Missing Analysis”. gatesnotes.com.
  63. ^ R.A. (March 6, 2013). “Institutions matter, a lot”. The Economist.
  64. ^ Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, The Narrow Corridor: States, Societies, and the Fate of Liberty. New York: Penguin, 2019.
  65. ^ Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. New York: PublicAffairs, 2023.
  66. ^ Daron Acemoglu and Simon Johnson, Power and Progress: Our Thousand-Year Struggle Over Technology and Prosperity. New York: PublicAffairs, 2023, Ch. 11.
  67. ^ Acemoglu, Daron (January 2001). “Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs”. Journal of Labor Economics. 19 (1): 1–21. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.687.4806. doi:10.1086/209978. JSTOR 10.1086/209978. S2CID 2316641.
  68. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Pischke, Jörn-Steffen (2003). Minimum Wages and On-the-job Training (PDF). Vol. 22. pp. 159–202. doi:10.1016/S0147-9121(03)22005-7. hdl:1721.1/63851. ISBN 978-0-7623-1026-5. ISSN 0147-9121.
  69. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Naidu, Suresh; Restrepo, Pascual; Robinson, James A. (March 2014). “Democracy Does Cause Growth”. NBER Working Paper No. 20004. doi:10.3386/w20004.
  70. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Naidu, Suresh; Restrepo, Pascual; Robinson, James A. (December 2013). “Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality”. NBER Working Paper No. 19746. doi:10.3386/w19746.
  71. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Aghion, Philippe (2001). “Deunionization, technical change and inequality”. Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy. 55: 229–264. doi:10.1016/s0167-2231(01)00058-6. S2CID 17495766. Archived from the original on August 10, 2018. Retrieved November 24, 2017.
  72. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2013). “Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy Advice”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 27 (2): 173–192. doi:10.1257/jep.27.2.173. hdl:1721.1/82599. Archived from the original on January 25, 2020. Retrieved December 1, 2019.
  73. ^ a b Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A.; Verdier, Thierry (October 2012). “Can’t We All Be More Like Scandinavians? Asymmetric Growth and Institutions in an Interdependent World”. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w18441.
  74. ^ Acemoglu, Daron (October 20, 2015). “A Scandinavian U.S. Would Be a Problem for the Global Economy”. The New York Times.
  75. ^ “Will everyone be worse off if the United States turns social democratic?”. Lane Kenworthy. September 29, 2012. Retrieved October 17, 2020.
  76. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James A. (June 2000). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”. Working Paper Series. National Bureau of Economic Research. doi:10.3386/w7771. Retrieved March 12, 2022. This quote is from a subsequent abstract, appearing before page 1, to their article but NOT in the abstract to their original article.
  77. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon; Robinson, James A. (2001). “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation”. The American Economic Review. 91 (5): 1369–1401. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.475.6366. doi:10.3386/w7771. JSTOR 2677930.
  78. ^ Levitt, Steven D. (April 20, 2012). “Acemoglu and Robinson Answer Your Questions”. Freakonomics. Archived from the original on November 6, 2017.
  79. ^ Acemoglu, Daron, Simon Johnson, James A. Robinson, and Pierre Yared, “Income and Democracy.” American Economic Review 98(3) 2008: 808–42.
  80. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James (2022). “Non-Modernization: Power–Culture Trajectories and the Dynamics of Political Institutions”. Annual Review of Political Science. 25: 323–339. doi:10.1146/annurev-polisci-051120-103913.
  81. ^ McCloskey, Deirdre (January 2015). “It was ideas and ideologies, not interests or institutions, which changed in Northwestern Europe, 1600–1848”. Journal of Evolutionary Economics. 25 (1): 57. doi:10.1007/s00191-015-0392-x. S2CID 154238344.
  82. ^ Edsall, Thomas B. (January 28, 2014). “Capitalism vs. Democracy”. The New York Times.
  83. ^ a b c Keller, Bill (December 22, 2013). “Inequality for Dummies”. The New York Times.
  84. ^ Abrams, Paul (June 5, 2012). “Romney-Ryan’s Why Nations Fail Economy vs. Obama’s Built to Last Economy”. HuffPost.
  85. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Johnson, Simon (August 15, 2017). “It’s Time to Found a New Republic”. Foreign Policy.
  86. ^ a b “Is democratic socialism the right path for America?”. CNN. October 28, 2015. (archived)
  87. ^ a b Acemoglu, Daron (January 5, 2009). “The Crisis of 2008: Lessons for and from Economics”. Hoover Institution.
  88. ^ Shea, Christopher (September 24, 2008). “Anti-bailout economists”. The Boston Globe.
  89. ^ a b c Roell, Sophie (December 2011). The best books on Inequality recommended by Daron Acemoglu.
  90. ^ a b Korones, Sarah (April 2, 2012). “Q&A: Daron Acemoglu, economist, on why nations fail”. ZDNet. Archived from the original on October 13, 2017.
  91. ^ a b Acemoglu, Daron (January 18, 2017). “We Are the Last Defense Against Trump”. Foreign Policy. Archived from the original on November 8, 2017. (, )
  92. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (March 11, 2012). “The Problem With U.S. Inequality”. HuffPost. (cached)
  93. ^ “Over 600 Economists Sign Letter In Support of $10.10 Minimum Wage”. Economic Policy Institute. January 14, 2014. Archived from the original on October 9, 2017.
  94. ^ Schiller, Ben (February 17, 2017). “Economists Are Not Very Enthusiastic About The Idea Of A Universal Basic Income”. Fast Company. Archived from the original on November 7, 2017.
  95. ^ Acemoglu, Daron (June 7, 2019). “Why Universal Basic Income Is a Bad Idea”. Project Syndicate.
  96. ^ “Why Universal Basic Income is a Bad Idea | by Daron Acemoglu”. June 7, 2019.
  97. ^ Giridharadas, Anand (August 26, 2011). “For Libya, a Light Hand May Be Best”. The New York Times.
  98. ^ “Drug Use Policies”. Initiative on Global Markets. December 12, 2011.
  99. ^ “A Letter of Support From the Academic Community: Yes on Amendment 64”. Colorado Campaign to Regulate Marijuana Like Alcohol. 2012. Archived from the original on March 4, 2013. Retrieved February 28, 2013.
  100. ^ Jiang, Jess (February 26, 2016). “Economists On Candidates’ Proposals: Mostly Bad”. NPR.
  101. ^ a b c Edsall, Thomas B. (April 24, 2019). “Bernie Sanders Scares a Lot of People, and Quite a Few of Them Are Democrats”. The New York Times.
  102. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (2015). “The Rise and Decline of General Laws of Capitalism”. Journal of Economic Perspectives. 29 (1): 3–28. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.687.2487. doi:10.1257/jep.29.1.3. hdl:1721.1/113636. S2CID 14001669. Archived from the original on February 13, 2017.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  103. ^ Sauga, Michael (October 12, 2019). “Political Economist Daran Acemoglu: ‘Trump Poses a Great Risk to U.S. Democracy’“. Der Spiegel.
  104. ^ Freeland, Chrystia (March 1, 2012). “Dignity and the Wealth of Nations”. The New York Times.
  105. ^ Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A. (March 21, 2012). “Will China Rule the World?”. HuffPost. Archived from the original on November 6, 2017.
  106. ^ Laidler, John (April 28, 2015). “Understanding Turkey”. Harvard Gazette. Harvard University. Archived from the original on September 15, 2017.
  107. ^ “Inside Turkey’s Economy – Interview with Daron Acemoglu”. GEDProject. Bertelsmann Stiftung. August 22, 2016. Archived from the original on September 24, 2021. 11:40 “The overall, sort of, unwillingness to come to grips with this, sort of, multiethnicity has, of course, characterized much of the Republican period.”
  108. ^ Freeland, Chrystia (June 6, 2013). “The perils of authoritarian overreaction”. The Globe and Mail.
  109. ^ Acemoglu, Daron (June 5, 2013). “Development Won’t Ensure Democracy in Turkey”. The New York Times.
  110. ^ Acemoglu, Daron (May 22, 2014). “The Failed Autocrat: Despite Erdogan’s Ruthlessness, Turkey’s Democracy Is Still on Track”. Foreign Affairs. (archived)
  111. ^ Erciyes, Cem (December 30, 2019). “How will Turkey enter the ‘Narrow Corridor’?”. Gazete Duvar.
  112. ^ “Acemoglu’s Advice to Armenia – Abolish the Oligarchy”. civilnet.am. October 24, 2013. Archived from the original on September 17, 2017.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  113. ^ Balyan, Varduhi (September 22, 2016). “Acemoğlu’ndan Ermenistan ve Diaspora yorumu”. Agos (in Turkish). Archived from the original on September 16, 2017. (, )
  114. ^ “Daron Acemoglu: Armenia’s Problems Within Its Own Political System”. civilnet.am. April 10, 2017. Archived from the original on September 17, 2017.{{cite news}}: CS1 maint: bot: original URL status unknown (link)
  115. ^ Acemoglu, Daron (March 14, 2014). “Ukraine’s legacy of serial oligopoly”. The Globe and Mail.
  116. ^ a b Kurtaran, Gokhan (August 4, 2015). “EU needs political and economic integration: Acemoglu”. Anadolu Agency.
  117. ^ “Greece”. Initiative on Global Markets. February 24, 2015.
  118. ^ Gürcanlı, Zeynep (March 30, 2011). “İlk Ermeni kökenli Türk büyükelçi Paris’e”. Hürriyet (in Turkish). Archived from the original on September 16, 2017.
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  121. ^ “Armenian Declines Davutoglu Appointment”. Asbarez. March 30, 2011.
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  124. ^ “Turkish main opposition leader unveils new vision to overcome economic crisis: Structural changes needed”. duvarenglish.com. Duvar. December 3, 2022. Archived from the original on December 4, 2022.
  125. ^ “Turkish pro-gov’t columnist targets economist Acemoğlu, says ‘I am his master’“. Duvar. December 5, 2022. Archived from the original on December 6, 2022.
  126. ^ “CHP’nin yeni ekonomi danışmanlarından Daron Acemoğlu Ermenistan’ın ekonomik krizini çözememişti”. Yeni Şafak (in Turkish). December 4, 2022. Archived from the original on December 6, 2022.
  127. ^ “Հենց նոր հեռախոսազրույց ունեցա հայազգի աշխարհահռչակ տնտեսագետ Դարոն Աճեմօղլուի հետ” (in Armenian). Nikol Pashinyan on Facebook. May 13, 2018. Archived from the original on February 26, 2022.
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  130. ^ “We had an interesting discussion with Professor Daron #Acemoglu and entrepreneur Noubar #Afeyan in Boston. The socio-economic situation in Armenia, investments, new jobs, public administration #reform, women empowerment were among the topics discussed”. AvinyanTigran on Twitter. July 22, 2019. Archived from the original on April 13, 2022.
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  143. ^ “2018 Jean-Jacques Laffont prize”. jjlaffont.org. L’Association Jean-Jacques Laffont.
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  153. ^ “Paul Romer and William Nordhaus – why they won the 2018 ‘economics Nobel’“. The Conversation. October 8, 2018. Archived from the original on August 20, 2021. Other economists followed this line of thinking (Robert Barro, Daron Acemoglu, Philippe Aghion – all prize candidates for a few years now)…
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Sources

Orionid meteor shower 2024: When to see ‘shooting stars’ from Halley’s comet next week

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Orionid meteor shower 2024: When to see ‘shooting stars’ from Halley’s comet next week

Orionid meteor shower 2024: When to see ‘shooting stars’ from Halley’s comet next week

The annual Orionid meteor shower — a dusty result of the trip Halley’s comet makes around the sun every 76 years, on average — will peak this week just as the famous constellation it’s named after rises into the autumn sky.

Active from Sept. 26 through Nov. 22, the Orionids will peak in the early hours of Monday, Oct. 21, when around 23 “shooting stars” are expected per hour, according to the American Meteor Society. The precise peak is predicted to occur at 1 a.m. EDT (0500 GMT).

Global celebration of Dark Matter Day planned with events around the world

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Global celebration of Dark Matter Day planned with events around the world

Global celebration of Dark Matter Day planned with events around the world

Each year, on and around October 31, particle physics laboratories, universities, and institutions around the world celebrate Dark Matter Day. Members of the public are invited to join both in-person and virtual events that include talks, activities, and fun for all ages.

Dark Matter Day is an international outreach initiative that aims to share the search for dark matter with public events that highlight what we know about dark matter, the many experiments seeking to solve this mystery, and the value of devoting scientific resources to unraveling this cosmic riddle.

  • Media interested in finding a 2024 Dark Matter Day event in their own coverage area can find a list here.
  • Institutions and organizations interested in hosting a Dark Matter Day event can learn more here.

Take a deeper dive into the topic of dark matter by tuning into Particle Mysteries: The Coldest Case, a podcast about the search for dark matter. New episodes will be released this October.

Dark Matter Day is sponsored by the Interactions Collaboration, an international community of particle physics communication specialists.

To find resources or to register your event, go to the Dark Matter Day website.

Patient-specific quality assurance (PSQA) based on independent 3D dose calculation – Physics World

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Patient-specific quality assurance (PSQA) based on independent 3D dose calculation – Physics World






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P0123 Code Meaning, Causes, Symptoms, And Fixes

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P0123 Code Meaning, Causes, Symptoms, And Fixes

The engine of your vehicle has different sensors. These sensors help the vehicle’s main computer to control different functions. The vehicle also contains a Throttle Position (TP) sensor. This sensor helps the PCM or ECM to regulate the proper fuel injection rate. When PCM/ECM monitors an issue with the signals coming from the TP sensor, it triggers the P0123 code. This article explains the P0123 code meaning, symptoms, and causes.  

P0123 Code Definition

P0123 trouble code stands for “Throttle Position Sensor/Switch A Circuit High Input.”

What does the P0123 Code Mean?

The P0123 code indicates that your powertrain control module (PCM) has detected that the voltage signal coming from the throttle position sensor A is higher than the specified limit.

P0123 Code

The throttle position (TP) sensor is a potentiometer that is installed on the throttle body and shaft that measures the position of the throttle valve.

The TP sensor is a device that helps the PCM to regulate the optimal fuel injection and ignition spark timing.

It performs this job by measuring how far the butterfly valve in the throttle body is open and how much air to draw into the intake manifold. The cars with an Electronic Throttle Control (ETC) have two throttle position sensors as a fail-safe measure.

When the PCM of your vehicle gets a signal from the throttle position sensor that exceeds the maximum limit for a specific period, it sets the trouble code P0123.

Specifically, cars with ETC use the accelerator pedal position (APP) sensor to determine the amount of accelerator pedal pressure. Your PCM may also trigger the code P0123 if there is an issue with the pedal position sensor instead of the throttle body sensor.

Causes of the P0123 Code

Your vehicle triggers the P0123 engine code due to one or more of the following causes:

  • Contaminated throttle body
  • A bad throttle position sensor
  • Loose or damaged connections
  • A bad pedal position sensor
  • Loose or improperly aligned TP sensor
  • Carbon-fouled throttle body
  • Damaged wires 
  • Circuit shorted to voltage
  • PCM issues (e.g., the software update is required)

Symptoms of P0123 Code

  • Check Engine Light illumination
  • Rough idle
  • Limp mode
  • Intermittent stalling
  • Poor fuel economy
  • Acceleration problems

Read More: P0102 Code Symptoms and Causes

How to Diagnose the P0123 Code

You need the following tools to diagnose or fix the P0123 code:

  • Electrical Cleaner
  • Auto Repair Manual
  • Diagnostic OBD Scan Tool
  • Throttle body cleaner
  • Basic Hand Tools
  • Multimeter

Follow the below-given steps to diagnose the P0123 code:

  1. Use an OBD-II scanner to scan the trouble code. Check the freeze frame data to examine the condition of your vehicle. Clear any trouble codes and test the vehicle again to see what comes back.
  2. Remove carbon deposits from the throttle body using a special cleaner.
  3. Properly inspect the connectors and wirings of your throttle position sensor for damage, corrosion, or short. Damaged wiring usually generates different issues, so it’s probably nothing more than a bad connection.
  4. Repair or replace the damaged connection or wiring, but continue to check the scanner data to ensure the fault has been fully resolved.
  5. Use a scan tool (i.e., a multimeter) to check the voltage at the A and B circuits of the throttle position sensor. Compare the voltage readings of the A and B circuits. If differences between data points are found, perform the TP sensor accuracy test as suggested by the car manufacturer.
  6. Replace your faulty sensor if necessary and clear codes.

 Common P0123 Code Diagnosis Mistakes

  • Replacing the throttle position sensor without inspecting the wiring and connections
  • Replacing the parts without testing them properly
  • No visual inspection of the wirings and connections first
  • Changing the TP sensor without confirming that it is the cause of the issue
  • Not scanning, recording, and erasing the codes, then try again to see the cause of failure.

What repairs can fix the P0123 Code?

One or more of the following repairs can fix the P0123:

  • Replacing or fixing the TP sensor connectors for shorting
  • Repairing or replacing the damaged wires
  • Replacing or cleaning the throttle body
  • Replacing the throttle position sensor 
  • Repairing or reprograming the PCM

Repair Cost of P0123 Code

The repair or fixing cost of the P0123 code varies according to the vehicle model, labor cost, and repair cost of the relevant part. To fix or repair the P0123 code, you may need one or more of the following repairs:

Parts Cost
Wiring short repair $20 to $510
TP sensor connector replacement $20 to $80
TP sensor replacement $90 to $320
Throttle body replacement  $15 to $670
Update PCM $40 to $270

How serious is the code P0123?

When P0123 is triggered, the powertrain control module of your vehicle may trigger the limp mode to prevent your vehicle’s transmission system and engine from being damaged.

The limp mode leads to various drive problems until the repair is complete. According to the manufacturer’s failsafe policy, drivability problems may include stalling, poor engine performance, speed limitation, bucking or jerking, high idle, or lack of acceleration.

FAQ Section

How to reset the throttle position sensor?

The best method to reset the TP sensor is to disconnect the negative battery cable for approximately 5 minutes or remove the fuse for the PCM.

Can I drive with a P0123 Code?

Yes, you can drive with DTC P0123. However, it is recommended to fix this code as soon as possible because it may create multiple drivability issues. When this code appears, your PCM shifts your car engine into failsafe mode. Due to this mode, you may face different problems, including poor acceleration, lack of engine power, higher fuel consumption, rough idle, or engine stalling.

Can I drive with a faulty throttle position sensor?

Yes, you can drive with a faulty throttle position sensor. However, driving with a faulty throttle position sensor is not recommended. This is because you may have multiple issues, including choppy or slow idle, poor engine performance, poor fuel economy, or lack of acceleration.

What happens when your throttle position sensor goes out?

As the throttle position sensor goes bad, you may face one of the below-given problems:

  • Check engine light illumination
  • An unexpected jerking and bucking driving.
  • A sudden increase in speed while moving on the highway.
  • Poor fuel economy
  • Sudden idle surges
  • Poor engine performance
  • Sudden engine stalling
  • Acceleration problems

How do I reset my electronic throttle control manually?

Make sure that the accelerator pedal is fully released and follow the below-given steps;

  1. Turn the ignition switch “ON
  2. Wait up to two seconds. 
  3. Turn the ignition switch “OFF” and wait a minimum of ten seconds. 
  4. Turn the ignition switch “ON” and wait a minimum of two seconds.
Read More
  1. P0068 Code Symptoms and Causes
  2. P0053 Code Symptoms and Causes
  3. P0102 Code Symptoms and Causes
  4. P0015 Code Symptoms and Causes
  5. P0014 Code Symptoms and Causes

Carbon Steel: The Ultimate Guide – 4 Main Types, Properties, and Applications

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Carbon Steel: The Ultimate Guide – 4 Main Types, Properties, and Applications

 

Carbon steel is an alloy of iron and carbon, with a carbon content of up to 2.1 wt.%. Unlike other types of steel, carbon steel does not have a minimum requirement for other alloying elements, but it often contains manganese. The maximum allowed content of other elements in carbon steel is 1.65 wt.% for manganese, 0.6 wt.% for silicon, and 0.6 wt.% for copper.

Carbon steel manufacturing process:

Carbon Steel: The Ultimate Guide – 4 Main Types, Properties, and Applications
Image by kjpargeter on Freepik

Carbon steel is a widely used material that is essential to many industries due to its unique properties, which include high strength, good ductility, and excellent machinability. The production of carbon steel can be done using a variety of methods, but one of the most common ways to produce it is through the use of virgin steel.

Virgin steel is produced by combining iron ore, coke, and lime in a blast furnace. The process starts by crushing the iron ore into small pieces and mixing it with coke and limestone. The coke is used as a fuel, and it burns in the furnace, producing the heat necessary for the process to proceed. The limestone acts as a flux, and it helps to remove impurities from the iron ore during the smelting process.

Once the materials are in the blast furnace, they are heated to temperatures of around 1650°C. At these high temperatures, the coke reacts with the oxygen in the air to produce carbon monoxide. This carbon monoxide then reacts with the iron ore, reducing it to molten iron. The molten iron is then enriched with carbon from the burning coke to produce molten steel, which typically contains around 4 wt.% carbon.

To produce carbon steel with the desired carbon content, the molten steel is subjected to a process called decarburisation. During decarburisation, oxygen is introduced into the melt, which oxidises the carbon in the steel and produces carbon monoxide and carbon dioxide. This reduces the carbon content of the steel to the desired amount, typically less than 2 wt.%.

Overall, the production of virgin steel is an important process that allows for the production of high-quality carbon steel with a wide range of properties, making it a versatile material used in many different industries.

Types of carbon steel and their properties

Carbon steel is a versatile and widely used material that comes in a variety of types, each with its own unique properties. Some of the most common types of carbon steel include:

  1. Low Carbon Steel: Also known as mild steel, this type of carbon steel contains a low amount of carbon (up to 0.3%) and is easy to shape and weld. It’s commonly used for structural applications, such as buildings and bridges.
  2. Medium Carbon Steel: With a carbon content of 0.3% to 0.6%, medium carbon steel is stronger than low carbon steel but still easy to machine and weld. It’s often used for gears, axles, and other machine parts.
  3. High Carbon Steel: This type of carbon steel contains a carbon content of 0.6% to 1.4%, making it strong and hard but also less ductile and difficult to weld. It’s commonly used for cutting tools, knives, and springs.
  4. Ultra-High Carbon Steel: With a carbon content of more than 1.4%, ultra-high carbon steel is extremely strong and hard but also brittle and difficult to work with. It’s used in applications that require extreme hardness, such as drill bits and saw blades.

Understanding the properties of each type of carbon steel is important in selecting the right material for a particular application.

  Examples Carbon content (wt.%) Microstructure Properties
Low-carbon steel AISI 304, ASTM A815, AISI 316L < 0.25 Ferrite, pearlite Low hardness, high ductility, toughness, machinability and weldability
Medium-carbon steel AISI 409, ASTM A29, SCM435 0.25 – 0.60 Martensite Low hardenability, medium strength, ductility and toughness
High-carbon steel AISI 440C, EN 10088-3 0.60 – 1.25 Pearlite High hardness, strength, low ductility
Ultra-High carbon steel AISI 1095, AISI 1080, W1 0.9 – 1.4 Ferrite, pearlite High hardness, strength, toughness, edge retention, machinability, weldability

Low carbon steel

 

carbon steel production
Image by fanjianhua on Freepik

Low-carbon steel is the most commonly used form of carbon steel due to its affordability and versatility. These steels typically contain less than 0.25 wt.% carbon and cannot be hardened by heat treatment to form martensite. Instead, they are strengthened through cold work or through the addition of other elements.

Carbon steels are generally soft and have low strength, but they exhibit high ductility, making them excellent for machining, welding, and other applications where formability is important.

High-strength, low-alloy (HSLA) steels are a type of low-carbon steel that contain small amounts of other elements, such as copper, nickel, vanadium, and molybdenum. These elements, which can make up to 10 wt.% of the steel content, help to increase the strength and hardness of the material while retaining ductility.

HSLA steels are often heat-treated to achieve their high strength and are more resistant to corrosion than plain low-carbon steels. They are easily formable and machinable, making them ideal for use in a range of industries, including construction, automotive, and aerospace.

 

Medium Carbon Steel

 

Medium-carbon steel contains between 0.25 and 0.60 wt.% carbon and 0.60 to 1.65 wt.% manganese. The addition of manganese improves the strength and hardenability of the steel. Heat treatment, which involves austenitizing followed by quenching and tempering, can improve the mechanical properties of medium-carbon steels, giving them a martensitic microstructure.

However, heat treatment can only be performed on thin sections of the steel. To improve the ability of medium-carbon steel to be heat treated and hardened, additional alloying elements such as chromium, molybdenum, and nickel may be added.

Hardened medium-carbon steels have greater strength than low-carbon steels, but this comes at the expense of ductility and toughness. Medium-carbon steels are often used in applications that require a balance of strength and ductility, such as shafts, gears, and axles in automotive and machinery industries. Understanding the properties of medium-carbon steel is important in selecting the right material for a particular application.

 

High-carbon steel

 

High-carbon steel contains between 0.60 and 1.25 wt.% carbon and 0.30 to 0.90 wt.% manganese. It is the hardest and toughest of the carbon steels but has the lowest ductility. Due to its high carbon content, high-carbon steel is typically hardened and tempered, making it very wear-resistant.

Tool steels and die steels are specific types of high-carbon steels that are used in applications where high wear resistance and toughness are critical. These steels contain additional alloying elements such as chromium, vanadium, molybdenum, and tungsten, which contribute to the formation of carbide compounds such as tungsten carbide (WC). This results in a very hard and wear-resistant steel that is well-suited for cutting tools, dies, and molds.

Despite their excellent wear resistance, high-carbon steels have limited use in applications where toughness and ductility are important. The brittleness of these steels makes them prone to fracture and failure under certain conditions. As with all steels, selecting the appropriate high-carbon steel for a given application requires careful consideration of the desired properties and the operating environment.

 

Ultra-high carbon steel

carbon steel gears

Ultra-high carbon steel is a type of steel that contains a very high percentage of carbon, typically between 1.25% and 2.0%. This high carbon content gives the steel exceptional hardness and wear resistance, making it ideal for use in cutting tools, knives, and other applications that require sharpness and durability. Ultra-high carbon steel also has high strength, making it well-suited for applications that require high levels of strength and durability.

One of the key characteristics of ultra-high carbon steel is its hardness. With a hardness typically above 60 HRC, ultra-high carbon steel is one of the hardest materials available. This makes it ideal for use in cutting tools and other applications where hardness and wear resistance are important. However, this high hardness also makes ultra-high carbon steel more brittle and less ductile than other types of steel, which can make it more difficult to work with.

Another important characteristic of ultra-high carbon steel is its wear resistance. Ultra-high carbon steel has excellent wear resistance, which makes it well-suited for applications that involve high levels of abrasion or impact. This makes it an excellent choice for use in machine parts, gears, and other industrial applications where wear resistance is important. However, it is important to note that ultra-high carbon steel may not be suitable for all applications, particularly those that require high levels of ductility or machinability.

 

Applications of Carbon Steel

 

Low-Carbon steel

 

SUS304 vs SS304 Stainless SteelLow-carbon steel is widely used in various applications due to its ductility, toughness, and affordability. Some common uses of low carbon steel include:

  1. Construction: Low carbon steel is often used in the construction industry to make structural components such as beams, columns, and girders.
  2. Automotive: It is used to manufacture car bodies, chassis, and other components due to its high strength and malleability.
  3. Pipes: Low carbon steel is used to make pipes for various applications, including water supply, gas transmission, and oil pipelines.
  4. Furniture: It is also used to manufacture furniture due to its strength and durability.
  5. Appliances: Low carbon steel is used in the production of various household appliances such as washing machines, refrigerators, and dishwashers.
  6. Manufacturing: It is used in the manufacturing of a wide range of products, including tools, machinery, and equipment, due to its excellent machinability and weldability.

Overall, low carbon steel is a versatile material that is used in many different applications due to its combination of strength, durability, and affordability.

Medium-carbon steel

 

Solidworks Prices Standard Professional StudentMedium-carbon steel has good strength and toughness and is often used in applications where high strength and wear resistance are required. Some common uses of medium-carbon steel include:

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  1. Automotive: Medium-carbon steel is used to manufacture parts such as gears, crankshafts, and axles due to its high strength and wear resistance.
  2. Machinery: It is used in the production of machinery and equipment components such as shafts, couplings, and sprockets.
  3. Construction: Medium-carbon steel is used in the construction of bridges, buildings, and other structures due to its strength and durability.
  4. Railway tracks: It is used to manufacture railway tracks and other rail components due to its wear resistance and strength.
  5. Tools: Medium-carbon steel is used to manufacture various types of cutting tools, including knives, saw blades, and drill bits, due to its hardness and toughness.
  6. Springs: It is also used to make springs and other components that require high strength and toughness.

Overall, medium-carbon steel is a versatile material that is used in many different applications where high strength, wear resistance, and toughness are required.

High-carbon steel

 

CATIA vs SOLIDWORKSSome common uses of high-carbon steel include:

  1. Cutting tools: High-carbon steel is used to make cutting tools such as knives, saw blades, and drill bits due to its hardness and wear resistance.
  2. Springs: It is used to make springs and other components that require high strength and durability, such as in automotive suspension systems.
  3. Automotive: High-carbon steel is used in the manufacture of various automotive components such as crankshafts, axles, and gears.
  4. Rails: It is used to manufacture railway tracks and other rail components due to its high strength and wear resistance.
  5. Wire ropes: High-carbon steel is used to make wire ropes and other cables that require high strength and durability.
  6. Construction: It is used in construction applications such as reinforcement bars and cables for bridges and high-rise buildings.

Overall, high-carbon steel is a specialized material that is used in applications where high strength, hardness, and wear resistance are critical. It is not as widely used as low or medium-carbon steel due to its brittleness and difficulty in working with, but it is essential for specific applications where its unique properties are necessary.

 

Ultra-high carbon steel

autodesk fusion 360 vs solidworksUltra-high carbon steel is primarily used in applications that require high levels of hardness, wear resistance, and strength. Some common applications of ultra-high carbon steel include:

  1. Cutting tools: Ultra-high carbon steel is commonly used to make cutting tools such as knives, saw blades, and drill bits. Its high hardness and wear resistance make it well-suited for cutting and drilling applications that require sharpness and durability.
  2. Industrial machine parts: Ultra-high carbon steel is often used to make machine parts such as gears, bearings, and shafts. Its high strength and wear resistance make it ideal for use in industrial settings where parts are subjected to high levels of stress and wear.
  3. Automotive parts: Ultra-high carbon steel can also be used to make automotive parts such as springs and suspension components. Its high strength and toughness make it well-suited for these applications, where durability and reliability are key.
  4. Mining equipment: Ultra-high carbon steel is often used in mining equipment such as drills and cutting tools. Its high hardness and wear resistance make it ideal for use in harsh mining environments where equipment is subjected to high levels of abrasion and impact.
  5. Musical instruments: Ultra-high carbon steel is sometimes used in the production of musical instruments such as guitars and cymbals. Its high density and unique acoustic properties make it well-suited for these applications, where tone and resonance are important.

Overall, ultra-high carbon steel is a versatile material that is well-suited for a wide range of applications where hardness, wear resistance, and strength are important. Its unique properties make it a valuable material in many industrial and manufacturing settings.

 

Properties of Various Grades of Carbon Steel

 

Type AISI/ASTM name Carbon content (wt.%) Tensile strength (MPa) Yield strength (MPa) Ductility (% elongation in 50 mm)
Ultra-Low 1010 0.10 325 180 28
Low 1020 0.20 380 205 25
Low A36 0.29 400 220 23
Low A516 Grade 70 0.31 485 260 21
Medium 1030 0.27 – 0.34 460 325 12
Medium 1040 0.37 – 0.44 620 415 25
High 1080 0.75 – 0.88 924 440 12
Ultra-High 1095 0.90 – 1.04 665 380 10

More about steel:

STEM Beyond Books | Inspire Students with Immersive STEM Learning

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STEM Beyond Books | Inspire Students with Immersive STEM Learning

Last Updated on September 4, 2024 by Zinab Hasssan

 By engaging students in dynamic, real-world applications of STEM, we not only spark their curiosity but also empower them to become innovative problem solvers. In this blog post, we will explore the exciting ways in which immersive learning can inspire the next generation of thinkers and creators ( inspire students with immersive STEM learning ), igniting a lifelong love for science and technology.

Discover The Importance of STEM Education

STEM Beyond Books | Inspire Students with Immersive STEM LearningSTEM Beyond Books | Inspire Students with Immersive STEM Learning

STEM education aims to combine four educational disciplines (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) into a cohesive learning paradigm based on real-world applications. Through STEM education, students gain and develop critical skills such as ,critical analysis, creativity, teamwork, communication, initiative, problem-solving, digital literacy, and more.

The importance of STEM can be summarized as follows:

  • Transformative Skill Set Development.
  • Meeting Global Workplace Demands.
  • Best Practices in all the Disciplines of STEM.
  • Edge Over Traditional Students
  • Instills leadership quality
  • Inventions In STEM Areas

How to Integrate Augmented Reality in a STEM Lab

How to Integrate Augmented Reality in a STEM LabHow to Integrate Augmented Reality in a STEM Lab

Augmented reality (AR) is an interactive technology that integrates the real-world objects and computer-generated 3D content (graphics, images, audio, and text). The content can span multiple sensory modalities, including visual, haptic, auditory, olfactory, and somatosensory.

Augmented reality improves physical learning in a STEM lab. Looking at pictures of molecules such as benzene isn’t the same as holding the molecules in your hands and manipulating them. AR can increase engagement, understanding, recall, and more.

Even better, students can create virtual models that can explore with AR, which can become reality via 3D printing. It’s a great way to help students apply theoretical principles and protocols and turn them into practical results.

To integrate augmented reality in a STEM lab, you need to follow the basic steps below:

Setting goals

It’s important to start by identifying the learning goals that connect with the curriculum. While it’s amazing for an individual lesson to be exciting and intellectually stimulating, ideally it should fit within a larger context of the applicable curricular aims and other lessons that are planned. That way, students can make connections between their learning in this activity and other activities before and after. Goal setting can be a little more complex in STEM labs because sometimes students may set some of their own targets. However, the ultimate learning objectives should still tie back to the curriculum. Students might set smaller goals that are milestones towards the larger, fixed goal.

Training and expectations

Students need to know how to use a tool – they need to be trained. And they need to know how they ought to behave when using the tool – they need to understand expectations.

It’s important  to note that when students don’t fully understand how to use a tool, they’re more likely to be disengaged from the task or come to dislike it. Students love being effective and competent, so good training in using AR and related tools is a great first step to success.

Behavioral expectations can also help to create the climate of scientific collaboration and discovery that’s ideal in STEM labs.

Responsibility and autonomy

Group work and project-based work are skills like any other. Students who aren’t used to working in groups, or who aren’t used to working in a more autonomous manner, may need help and preparation to succeed. That’s true for all STEM lab work, but even more so for work with AR, which may be confusing because it’s new to students.

While social-emotional skills like metacognition, autonomy, and teamwork aren’t typically a part of STEM, they are vital for success in future life – which is just another reason why STEM labs can be so valuable.

Assessments

Creating good assessments is an art. In some cases, AR makes this task easier – although not always.

Firstly, it goes without saying that STEM labs with AR are not the ideal venues to use formative or summative assessments in the form of paper quizzes and tests. Formative assessments may be easiest to conduct through observation, as a teacher walks through the STEM lab and checks on students’ understanding and progress. Before the project begins, teachers should also think about what they’ll do if the formative assessment suggests that the plan needs adjustments as it goes along – such as if students are stuck on a certain aspect of the task and need more help.

On the other hand, project-based learning is likely to create products that can be used for summative assessment, which can make assessment easier and more natural than a paper test. The key here is to ensure that the activities and the assessment address the same skills and match up appropriately.

Source: How to Integrate Augmented Reality in a STEM Lab | Classvr

Discover Why Integrated STEM Education is the Key to Building Bridges .. Read more!

 

Active Learning Tools for the STEM lectures

Active Learning Tools for the STEM lecturesActive Learning Tools for the STEM lectures

Active learning is a way of learning in which students are actively involved in the learning process.

Active learning tools can help decision-makers in higher education on how to prepare students to complete their studies and enter STEM careers. Active learning tools help students develop the skills they need to meet the demands of the modern workforce.

There are several ways and tools  that are used to apply active learning in  STEM lectures. Let’s take some examples:

  • Clarification Pauses
  • Writing Activities such as the “Minute Paper”
  • Self-Assessment
  • Large Group Discussion
  • Peer Review
  • Group Evaluations
  • Think-Pair-Share
  • Brainstorming
  • Inquiry Learning
  • Case Studies
  • Hands-on Technology
  • Interactive Lecture
  • Active Review Sessions (Games or Simulations)
  • Role Playing
  • Cooperative Groups in Class (Informal Groups, Triad Groups, etc)
  • Jigsaw Discussion
  • Forum Theater
  • Experiential Learning
  • Virtual lab simulation

The following figure describes and compares between active learning and passive learning:

The following figure describes and compares between active learning and passive learning:The following figure describes and compares between active learning and passive learning:

How Virtual Labs Ignite Active Learning

Virtual labs are now one of the most effective educational solutions used in higher education and schools to enhance active learning outcomes and student engagement.

The 3D interactive virtual lab solutions provide students with access to realistic labs and enrich their understanding with a variety of informational and educational content to enhance their understanding and learning, with the aim of providing equal opportunity for an enhanced STEM education for students everywhere.

A lot of universities, colleges, and educational institutions have already adopted virtual labs as they recognize the vital role of virtual environments in increasing active learning and student engagement.

Transform Your Classroom: How PraxiLabs Promotes Active STEM Learning

Transform Your Classroom: How PraxiLabs Promotes Active STEM LearningTransform Your Classroom: How PraxiLabs Promotes Active STEM Learning

In PraxiLabs, we provide highly interactive and immersive 3D simulations that mimic real-life labs. And while our focus is on scientific correctness and proper representation of labs, we also provide further support and guidance through our supplementary material and immediate feedback to not only exercise specific steps of an experiment but to also experience and learn about the experiment for a better understanding.

PraxiLabs also provides instant and unlimited access to any STEM lab simulations you want from anywhere, without the hassle of going to the laboratory. Let your young scientists enjoy their journey, at any time!

With PraxiLabs students get a full experience, with guidance and learning materials to further aid the learning process rather than simply following instructions .

With PraxiLabs students can actively learn besides performing their experiments.

With PraxiLabs students can actively learn besides performing their experiments.With PraxiLabs students can actively learn besides performing their experiments.

 65% of learners are VISUAL. PraxiLabs provides various multimedia forms

30% are AUDITORY. PraxiLabs uses VO guidance.

 5% are KINAESTHETIC. PraxiLabs provides more virtual “hands-on” experience

Each student absorbs knowledge and information differently. While class lectures, textbooks, and lab experiments are each separately effective for each learning style, PraxiLabs combines its virtual lab with additional multimedia and text to provide each learner with material that fits his/her learning style.

 Request a Live Demo Now and Increase your Students’ Learning Retention and Engagement With PraxiLabs’ virtual labs!

How immersive learning enhance the student learning?

Immersive learning is a learning method in which students are immersed into a virtual environment by using virtual reality technology to simulate the real world. You can inspire students with immersive STEM learning and motivate them  to act with intention and to become active participants in learning, rather than being passive recipients. Immersive learning also decreases the cognitive load for the students and increases their engagement.

How might you engage your students with STEM activities?

You can engage your students with STEM activities by following effective and engaging strategies such as:

  • Blending virtual reality technology into the STEM classrooms.
  • Diversify learning content for optimized engagement.
  • Encourage student voice and choice.
  • Incorporate hands-on activities.
  • Incorporate student decision-making into classroom lessons.
  • Focus on STEM-related skills.

What are the motivational factors of students in choosing STEM strand? 

According to a study, the factors of students in choosing STEM strand that have the potential to engage students in shaping their skills in line with their chosen course are:

1) Career, wherein the student says that it is related to the course they will take in college and to the job they want to have in the future.

2) Interest, where some students say that they want to challenge themselves in Mathematics and Science to improve their understanding and skills.

3) Uncontrolled Circumstances, wherein they have no other choice because of their parent’s decision to take this strand.

Students believe that the STEM strand is the right choice for them. The specialized subject such as Mathematics and Science in this strand is very significant to those students who need mastery in their tertiary degree.

Study link

 On PraxiLabs, you can find different virtual lab simulations accessible anytime and anywhere. Subscribe and inspire students with immersive STEM learning!

 

 

Australia–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Difference between revisions

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Australia–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Difference between revisions

 

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The ”’Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement”’ (”’KAFTA”’) is a bilateral [[free trade agreement]] designed to diminish barriers to trade and investment between [[Australia]] and [[South Korea]]. Coming into force on 12 December 2014, this agreement confers substantially improved market access for Australian exporters of goods and services, as well as for investors seeking opportunities within the South Korean market.<ref>{{Cite web|title=KAFTA outcomes at a glance|url=https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/fact-sheets/Pages/kafta-outcomes-at-a-glance|access-date=2021-12-06|website=Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade|language=en}}</ref> KAFTA builds upon several decades of [[bilateral relation]]s, rooted in diplomatic, trade, and security cooperation, which have evolved since 1962. During that year, President [[Park Chung-Hee]] introduced a series of [[Five-Year Plans of South Korea|five-year economic plans]] aimed at fostering South Korea’s industrial development and accelerating its integration into the global economy in the aftermath of the [[Korean War]].

The ”’Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement”’ (”’KAFTA”’) is a bilateral [[free trade agreement]] designed to diminish barriers to trade and investment between [[Australia]] and [[South Korea]] December 2014 agreement confers substantially improved market access for Australian exporters of goods and services, as well as for investors seeking opportunities within the South Korean market.<ref>{{Cite web|title=KAFTA outcomes at a glance|url=https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/agreements/in-force/kafta/fact-sheets/Pages/kafta-outcomes-at-a-glance|access-date=2021-12-06|website=Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade|language=en}}</ref> KAFTA builds upon several decades of [[bilateral relation]]s, rooted in diplomatic, trade, and security cooperation, which have evolved since 1962. During that year, President [[Park Chung-Hee]] introduced a series of [[Five-Year Plans of South Korea|five-year economic plans]] aimed at fostering South Korea’s industrial development and accelerating its integration into the global economy in the aftermath of the [[Korean War]].

== Historical background ==

== Historical background ==

KAFTA
Australia–Korea Free Trade Agreement: Difference between revisions

Map indicating South Korea (orange) and Australia (green)

Type Free trade agreement
Signed 8 April 2014 (2014-04-08)
Location Seoul, South Korea
Effective 12 December 2014 (2014-12-12)
Original
signatories
  • Australia Andrew Robb, Minister for Trade and Investment
  • South Korea Yoon Sang-jick, Minister for Trade, Industry and Energy

The Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) is a bilateral free trade agreement designed to diminish barriers to trade and investment between Australia and South Korea, effective from the 12th December 2014. The agreement confers substantially improved market access for Australian exporters of goods and services, as well as for investors seeking opportunities within the South Korean market.[1] KAFTA builds upon several decades of bilateral relations, rooted in diplomatic, trade, and security cooperation, which have evolved since 1962. During that year, President Park Chung-Hee introduced a series of five-year economic plans aimed at fostering South Korea’s industrial development and accelerating its integration into the global economy in the aftermath of the Korean War.

Historical background

[edit]

Before the Korean War began on the 25 June 1950, Australian involvement in the Korean region was very limited, with the first documented contact between Korea and Australia occurring in 1889 when a group of missionaries from Australia arrived in Busan.[2] Bilateral relations between Australia and the ROK were fostered by both Australia’s involvement in the UN Commission on Korea (1947) and during the Korean War (1950–53), with approximately 17000 Australian soldiers serving to aid the ROK during the Korean War.[3] 1961 saw the establishment of full diplomatic relations between Australia and the ROK with The ROK consulate general in Sydney elevated to embassy status and the establishment of the first Korean ambassador in April 1962.[2] Similarly, Australia established its embassy in Seoul in June 1962, with 2021 marking the 60th anniversary of full diplomatic ties between Australia and the ROK.[4] The economic link between Australia & the ROK was also forged in the 1960s, when the ROK’s rapid industrialization due to President Park Chung-Hee series of five-year plans required vast amounts of raw materials that could be supplied by Australia in substantial quantities.[5] Historically, migration has underlined relations between Australia and the ROK, Korean migration to Australia began around the 1970 and has since increased over the decades with the population of Korean immigrants growing from 60 in 1970 to approximately 72 963 people of Korean ethnic origin having migrated under various categories including skilled and business migration.[6] This shared bilateral history of Australia and Korea culminated over the five-year negotiation period of KAFTA, encompassing all aspects and provisions of the FTA, beginning with the Australian Labor Party Government under Kevin Rudd in 2009 and concluding under the Australian Liberal Party Government of Tony Abbot.[7] Korea is now Australia’s fourth largest trading partner and shares a variety of economic, strategic and political interests in the Asia-Pacific and global spheres.[6]

Australian Trade Minister Andrew Robb and Korean Trade Minister Yoon Sang-jick, concluded negotiations on the Agreement in early December 2013 and the legally verified text of the agreement was initialed by Chief Negotiators on 10 February 2014.[8] In April 2014, the Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott led a trade delegation to Japan, South Korea and China. The three economies accounted for more than half of all of Australia’s two-way trade.[9] On the South Korean leg of the mission, Abbott signed the Australia Korea Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) with the government of Park Geun-hye in Seoul on 8 April.[10] The agreement came into force on 12 December 2014.[11]

According to Australia’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australia and Korea have “one of the strongest and most complementary trading relationships in the Asia-Pacific region. The Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) reduces trade and investment barriers, making it easier for Australians to do business with Korea – our 4th largest trading partner.”[12]

This section provides an overview of the key provisions of KAFTA including:

Chapter 2 of the KAFTA agreement outlines the provisions of the agreement regarding “Trade in goods”. The articles under this section outline the way in which trade can be conducted under the free trade agreement that is KAFTA.[13] For example, article 2.3 ‘Elimination of Custom duties’ outlines that ‘neither Party shall increase any existing customs duty, or adopt any new customs duty, on an originating good.’ As well as that ‘each Party shall progressively eliminate its customs duties on originating goods.’ [13] Similarly, article 2.9 ‘Export Duties, Taxes or Other Charges’ outlines that ‘Neither Party shall adopt or maintain any duty, tax or other charge on the export of any good to the territory of the other Party, unless the duty, tax or charge is also adopted or maintained on the good when destined for domestic consumption.’ [13]

Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures

[edit]

This section of provisions relates to the protocols surrounding rules of origin and origin procedures within the KAFTA agreement. Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures are criteria which determine the origins of a good as well as the general requirements and conditions for a good to be traded as something that originated from a nation.[14] The provisions of Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures within The KAFTA Agreement are outlined in this section and set the precedent for “Originating Goods”, “Wholly Obtained Goods”, and the “Regional Value Content”.[15] This section also provisions Origin Procedures including the “Certificate of Origin”, “Authorized Bodies”, “Discrepancies and Variations” as well as “Record Keeping Requirements”, which are deemed essential by both nations in maintaining a productive trade relationship.[15]

Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation

[edit]

The objective of the provisions under the section Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation are to for both Australia and South Korea:

  1. Simplify the customs procedures of the cooperating states.[16]
  2. Ensure predictability, consistency and transparency in the application of customs laws, regulations and administrative procedures of the Parties.[16]
  3. Ensure the efficient and expeditious clearance of goods.[16]
  4. Facilitate trade between the Parties.[16]
  5. Promote cooperation between the customs administrations of Australia and South Korea.[16]

In this section, the above objectives are attained by the provision of transparency measures, the harmonization of documents and data elements, the use of Automated Systems in the Paperless Trading Environment, Appeal Procedures, all of which are encapsulated by the KAFTA agreement.[16]

The section covers the provisions pertaining to investment within and between Australia and South Korea. It encapsulates the majority of KAFTAs provisions regarding the financial sector, including National Treatment, which relates to the way in which each nations financial institution shall accord to investors of the other nation with treatment no less favorable than that it accords to its own investors.[17]

Similarly, the Minimum Standard of Treatment clause within the Investment provision notes that “Each Party shall accord to covered investments treatment in accordance with the customary international law minimum standard of treatment of aliens, including fair and equitable treatment and full protection and security.”[17]

The objective of the section on Cooperation within the KAFTA FTA is to facilitate bilateral cooperation and promote an exploration of new cooperative activities between Australian and South Korea in the fields of agriculture, fisheries and forestry, building on top of already existing relationships in the political and business world between the two states to support mutual development and economic growth.[18] This section on cooperation places large emphasis on cooperation in the industries of agriculture and Energy and Mineral Resources with the establishment of a joint Committee on Agricultural Cooperation as well as a joint Committee on Energy and Mineral Resources Cooperation.[18]

Australian Goods Exporters

[edit]

ROK-Australia Foreign Ministers bilateral meeting, 13 October 2017.

Due to KAFTA’s provisions, around 99 per cent of goods exported from Australia to Korea are authorized to enter duty-free and/or with preferential access.[19] For Australia’s agricultural sector, tariffs were eliminated on Korean importation of raw sugar, bottled wine, wheat and some horticulture. Australia’s beef industry has benefited from KAFTA with the ROK progressively reducing the 40 per cent tariff on beef by January 1, 2028.[19] Australia’s dairy industry has also seen benefits, receiving duty free quotas for cheese, butter and infant formula. The manufacturing, resources and energy sectors of Australia’s economy have benefited as well, with the removal of all tariffs on their export to Korea progressively phasing out by January 1, 2023, these include tariffs on liquefied natural gas (LNG), unwrought aluminum and automotive parts.[19] Tariffs on Australian pharmaceutical products have also been eliminated.[19]

Australian Services Providers

[edit]

KAFTA has provided Australian services exporters with preferential treatment in the Korean market, benefiting sectors including finance, legal, telecommunications and education.[20] Outcomes include law and accounting firms have the capacity to establish representative offices in the ROK. On the December 12th, 2016, firms were given permission under the FTA to “enter into cooperative agreements with local law firms”. The agreement also stipulates that Australian firm may establish joint ventures and hire local lawyers.[20] For Australian Accountants, KAFTA has made it possible for them to establish offices in Korea and to provide consulting services on both international and Australian accounting laws in Korea.[20] The agreement stipulated that by 12 December 2019, Australian accountants were able to work and invest within accounting firms in South Korea.[20] KAFTA has enabled Australian education and engineering sectors to increase their capacity in the Korean market due to “commitments to guarantee existing market access for Australian providers and work towards improving mutual recognition of qualifications.”[20] In May 2015, Engineers Australia signed an agreement with the Korean Government which enhanced the recognition of Australian engineering professionals in the ROK.[21]

According to the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs & Trade KAFTA has improved prospects for Australian investors/investments in Korea and Korean investors/investments in Australia.[22] The FTA denotes that the ROK through the progressive reduction of market access barriers will provide greater entry for Australian’s into the Korean market, similarly, the screening threshold for Korean investors in non-sensitive sectors has been loosened by Australia.[20] The agreement also stipulates provisions to ensure “non-discrimination, and protection and security for investments”. to enhance protection and certainty for Australian and Korean investors.[20] Additionally, the Australian government in the FTA has altered the screening threshold for private Korean investors in “non-sensitive” sectors from 252 million AUD to $1.134 billion AUD.[20] A key clause which has been an outcome of merit for the KAFTA agreement is the establishment of a “negative list” regime which simply presumes that a financial service is allowed “unless specifically prohibited and commits Korea to allow new financial services it would permit its own financial institutions to provide.”[23]

Whilst an FTA is principally economic in nature and an arrangement for liberalized trade, it often triggers security implications. The signing of KAFTA also underlines the shared security concerns of both Australia and Korea in the Indo-Pacific and the Korean Peninsula.[24] Being two significant middle powers in the Asia-Pacific region, Australia and the ROK share strategic interests and have served in conflicts and peace keeping exercises in relation to non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction as well as events on the Korean peninsula that have threatened regional security.[25] The frequency and tempo of military discussions, training exercises and industry cooperation is increasing between Australia and the ROK since KAFTAs inception.[26] Similarly, the round of biennial foreign and defense minister meetings in 2019 placed emphasis on a “common strategic outlook”.[26] The signing of KAFTA has contributed to the recognition of Australia and the ROKs relationship being elevated to Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.[25]

Attitudes towards the KAFTA free trade agreement have been both positive and concerned since its signing. The Australian Embassy in South Korea reported that after a year of the FTA, “it is already making a big impact”,[27] Citing statistics that Koreas exports to Australia rose by 7.5%.[27] Similarly, Australian consumers have benefited from a larger access to Korean products, creating a positive attitude within the existing Korean population in Australia towards the agreement. Australian attitudes are also positive due to agricultural exports like beef, nuts and Brussels sprouts steadily increasing, creating a larger market for Australia’s agricultural industry.[27] KAFTA has also been viewed positively by Australians because Australian’s stands to benefit from a robust South Korea more than many due to strong two-way merchandise trade, services trade and direct investment growth as well as the growth of people-to-people links formed by KAFTA. [1]

Some Australian attitudes have been more concerned. With Labor minister Penny Wong suggesting Australia’s free trade agreement with South Korea should be scrutinized in greater depth.[28] Citing a clause in the agreement which grants the Korean Government the right to reimpose large tariffs on Australian beef if exports grow by more than 2% a year.[28] Similarly, Liberal backbencher at the time of KAFTAs signing Sharman Stone who represented the electorate of Murray in Victoria, a large agricultural electorate, criticised the FTA for failing to deliver reductions on a variety of Australian food exports.[28]

In 2014 KAFTA elevated the status of the economic relationship between South Korea and Australia, with South Korea becoming Australia’s fourth largest trading partner as a result.[26] Economically this has created a positive sentiment in the Korean market, with greater access to Australian mining and agricultural goods.[26] Similarly South Korean Attitudes have been overall positive with Migration and education enriching the relationship between the two nations in the years since KAFTAs signing.[26] Strategically, South Korea sits in a precarious position and the security relationship formed through KAFTA and diplomatic alignment has been a positive influence strategically for South Korea.[5] Leading President Moon Jae-in to describe Australia as Korea’s “everlasting friend and partner”.[26]

Monthly value of Australian merchandise exports to South Korea (A$ millions) since 1988
Monthly value of South Korean merchandise exports to Australia (A$ millions) since 1988
  1. ^ “KAFTA outcomes at a glance”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 6 December 2021.
  2. ^ a b “Republic of Korea country brief”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  3. ^ “Korean War, 1950-53 | Australian War Memorial”. www.awm.gov.au. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  4. ^ Robertson, Jeffery (2017). “More than Old Friends? Narrative in Australia’s Relationship with Korea”. The Australian Journal of Politics and History. p. 16. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  5. ^ a b Hyun Seok, Yu’s (2011). “The Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement and Its Security Implications”. Korea Observer. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  6. ^ a b corporateName=Commonwealth Parliament; address=Parliament House, Canberra. “Chapter 1 Australia’s engagement with the Korean peninsula”. www.aph.gov.au. Retrieved 29 December 2021.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  7. ^ To-hai, Liou (2016). “An Analysis of FTA-Centered South Korea-Australia Economic Relations”. National Chengchi University – via ResearchGate.
  8. ^ Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, About the Korea-Australia FTA, Australian Government
  9. ^ Kenny, Mark (11 April 2014). “Abbott in China shows skills beyond his years”. The Sydney Morning Herald. Fairfax Media. Archived from the original on 15 May 2014.
  10. ^ “Australia signs free trade agreement with South Korea in Seoul”. ABC News. Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 8 April 2014. Archived from the original on 1 November 2016.
  11. ^ Robb, Andrew (3 December 2014). “Robb announces Korea FTA to take effect in 9 days” (Press release). Archived from the original on 25 December 2014.
  12. ^ KAFTA – a snapshot Archived 14 July 2014 at the Wayback Machine; DFAT
  13. ^ a b c “Chapter 2: Trade in Goods”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  14. ^ Government of Canada, Canada Border Services Agency (17 October 2017). “Memorandum D11-5-15 – Canada–European Union Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) Rules of Origin”. www.cbsa-asfc.gc.ca. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  15. ^ a b “Chapter 3: Rules of Origin and Origin Procedures”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  16. ^ a b c d e f “Chapter 4: Customs Administration and Trade Facilitation”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  17. ^ a b “Chapter 11: Investment”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 29 December 2021. Text was copied from this source, which is available under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License.
  18. ^ a b “Chapter 16: Cooperation”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 29 December 2021.
  19. ^ a b c d “KAFTA and trade in goods”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 3 January 2022.
  20. ^ a b c d e f g h “KAFTA outcomes at a glance”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 3 January 2022.
  21. ^ “International Affiliates | Mutual Recognition Agreements | Engineers Australia”. www.engineersaustralia.org.au. Retrieved 3 January 2022.
  22. ^ “Investor-State dispute settlement under the Korea-Australia Free Trade”. www.allens.com.au. Retrieved 3 January 2022.
  23. ^ “KAFTA and trade in financial services”. Australian Government Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade. Retrieved 4 January 2022.
  24. ^ Yu, H.S. (2011). “The Korea-Australia Free Trade Agreement and Its Security Implications”. Korea Observer. 42: 47–67 – via ProQuest Central.
  25. ^ a b “Australia and South Korea ties will be elevated to the status of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership”. www.abc.net.au. Retrieved 3 January 2022.
  26. ^ a b c d e f Valdman, SquizMat (17 August 2021). “Friends in need: realigning the Australia-South Korea partnership”. Asialink. Retrieved 4 January 2022.
  27. ^ a b c Trade, corporateName= Department of Foreign Affairs and. “Australian Embassy in”. southkorea.embassy.gov.au. Retrieved 4 January 2022.
  28. ^ a b c “Australia’s free trade agreement with South Korea should be scrutinised | Penny Wong”. the Guardian. 20 February 2014. Retrieved 4 January 2022.

Relive SpaceX’s epic Starship launch (and rocket catch) in these jawdropping photos and video

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Relive SpaceX’s epic Starship launch (and rocket catch) in these jawdropping photos and video

Fresh images of Starship’s flight test on Sunday (Oct. 13) look like incredible abstract art from space.

SpaceX released the photos late Tuesday (Oct. 15) to celebrate the fifth test flight of its Starship megarocket, which saw the vehicle’s Super Heavy first stage caught by launch tower “chopsticks” seven minutes after liftoff.

Budgeting with Qubits / Make the most of your photons | by Quandela Team | Quandela

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Budgeting with Qubits / Make the most of your photons | by Quandela Team | Quandela

Budgeting with Qubits / Make the most of your photons | by Quandela Team | Quandela
Quandela
Article by Lucija Grba

Linear optical quantum computation uses photons as carriers of information (i.e. qubits) in an optical circuit with beam splitters and phase shifters that process this information. You can read more about how optical quantum computing works here.

Let different outputs of an optical quantum circuit correspond to different spending models one can obtain with a specific number of photons corresponding to their limited budget. Naturally, the more spending models we have access to, the more options we have to choose from and therefore have a higher likelihood of making an optimal choice. If before we had the categories ‘food’ and ‘travelling’, we will surely benefit from branching out these categories into ‘groceries’, ‘fast food’, ‘restaurants’ and ‘flights’, ‘public transportation’ etc. While we may have given a high importance to the category ‘food’ before as it is essential to our survival, we can now identify that some categories like ‘fast food’ and ‘restaurants’ aren’t as essential as ‘groceries’ so we have a higher chance of making better choices with a limited budget.

For the creation of a good photon spending model, it’s important not only to know how many photons there are in a budget (entered the circuit) and where they were found in the end (on which output modes). It’s important to also quantify the photon expenses on each mode (how many photons are found in which output mode), so you have a better chance of reaching that photon distribution you’re looking for.

Are you looking for a way to do more complex computations with a limited photon budget but you find yourself not knowing your photon distribution at the end of your computation? Fear not, we have you covered! Keep reading to discover how to make the most of your photons with our new feature — pseudo photon number resolution (PPNR or pseudo PNR).

1. Why is PNR important?

The use of photons as quantum processing units has an advantage of satisfying 5 DiVincenzo conditions for building a quantum computer (remind yourself of these by reading this short article). It also gives access to a truncated Fock space, that is larger than the qubit space. We measure this difference by the size of the Hilbert spaces that describe them mathematically. You can read more about the difference between these in one of our previous articles here.

Without PNR, we can only work within a Fock space truncated down to the same size as the qubit space size. The plot above demonstrates the power of PNR in enlarging the computational space size, even with maximum resolution of 2 photons.

In short, using the photonic Fock space gives us a scaling advantage. With the same number of photons, the Fock space is much larger than the qubit space, and therefore allows us to construct and work within a greater computational space. Essentially, we can do more with less, helping you make the most of your photons! This can be viewed as the expansion of the number of categories we consider for our photon spending model we talked about earlier.

We previously stated that we couldn’t count the number of photons in a single output mode with perfect accuracy, limiting our access to some states in the Fock space, i.e. a truncated Fock space. While perfect accuracy is still difficult to achieve, we are happy to share that we have made a great stride towards it!

Perceval users can now configure their modes, declaring them photon number resolving or not. This is an optional feature already introduced in our software and ready for use!

2. PNR integration

You’ve probably heard about microprocessors or classical processing units (CPUs). Think of them as the brains of a computer, processing and analysing information using classical operations. They are connected to other parts of the computer through pins, some of which have a predefined function (meaning that they can only perform one function, such as RESET pins) while others are configurable. These are called general purpose input/output (GPIO) and are much more useful.

An analogy of the same idea of configurable ports can be applied on optical devices in a quantum processing unit (QPU). A QPU differs from a CPU in the way its computations are performed, harnessing the power of physical behaviours occurring with quantum particles.

Photon detection works based on a grid — changing the position and number of photons found in each mode of the grid changes the state of the system (spending model considered). This is why having access to a PNR detector is imperative to achieving high fidelity. A single photon detector (SPD) would only be able to tell us whether it detected any photons at all (giving us the output 1) or none at all (outputting 0). You can visualise the difference between the capabilities of PNR and SPD below.

PNR vs SPD

In simple terms, PNR detectors allow you to analyse your photon distribution better (as they have access to more spending models) so you naturally have a better chance of finding that distribution you’ve been dreaming of obtaining. Now you might be wondering: how is PNR achieved in a photonic quantum computer?

Our newest feature uses balanced beam splitters attached to the modes the user has declared PNR. Recall that a beam splitter is an optical device containing 2 input modes and 2 output modes. It controls the direction of the photons that pass through it. A balanced beam splitter gives a photon entered through either of the inputs a 50% chance of ending up in either of the outputs (the choice is random), as it can either reflect off the beam splitter or be transmitted through it.

transmittance / reflection

Imagine a mode containing 2 photons connected to our PPNR detector. Reaching a balanced beam splitter, these photons will end up either taking the same route and will therefore be found in the same mode with a 50% probability, or they will each go their way and be found in separate modes with a 50% probability.

There are 4 different ways 2 photons might travel through a beam splitter, each equally likely to occur (each with 25% probability)

Case 1: Input 1 and input 2 were both reflected and came out the outputs 1 and 2 respectively.

Case 2: Input 1 was reflected and input 2 was transmitted so they both ended up in output 1.

Case 3: Input 1 was transmitted and input 2 was reflected so they both ended up in output 2.

Case 4: Input 1 and input 2 were both transmitted and came out the outputs 2 and 1 respectively.

Since photons are indistinguishable, we recognise that there’s a 50% probability of the photons splitting up and 50% probability of them ending up in the same mode.

We call this pseudo PNR because we obtain the photon distribution probabilistically and not deterministically. In simple terms, we do not have full control over whether a photon gets reflected or transmitted as this happens randomly, with a certain probability (50%).

We constructed a set-up that manipulates how our photons travel and gives us a good chance of counting 2 photons if they are travelling together in a single mode. An example of a non-pseudo PNR would be PNR that deterministically determines the number of photons in a mode by measuring the intensity of light. The more photons are found in a mode, the stronger their light will be. If we can deterministically measure the brightness, we are 100% confident in the photon count and this would be true PNR.

For now, PPNR can only be used on the first 3 modes of our QPU and its simulator, but this can also help us infer knowledge about other modes. You can test its performance for an up to 2-photon number resolution with 50% accuracy. The feature can easily be implemented in a single line of code, as shown in the picture below.

Stay tuned for future releases on more modes!

This is a great step forward, broadening the limits of what is possible to do in our framework and paving the way for some very exciting applications. In quantum machine learning, it allows us to work with more complex learning models as we are able to work in a larger computational space (Fock space). You can find a simple visual explanation for why that is the case here. Furthermore, in quantum algorithms for classification (VQC), access to PNR allows the creation of a highly expressive ansatz, automatically increasing the complexity of the circuit without increasing the number of photons used. You can explore how and why we use VQC on our very own QPU Ascella here.

So, what are you waiting for? Uncover the full potential of our new feature and make the most of your photons!